Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1: Concept and Objects of Regulation

1.0 Concept of Regulation
   1.1. Interferences
   1.2 Definitions of Regulation
   1.3 Perspectives on Regulation
   1.4 Problems of Regulation: Establishment, Change,
    Administration, Enforcement

2.0 Scope and Objects of Regulation

3.0 Conclusion

Chapter 2: Problems and Trends in the Creation
     and Life of Administrative/Regulatory Organizations

1.0 Experience during the American Revolution as an Example of the Problem of
   the Creation of Administrative Organization

2.0 Earlier Forms of Regulation and Their Inadequacies; Historical Trends in Regulation

3.0 The Life Cycles of Regulatory Agencies and Regulated Industries

3.1 The Regulatory System

3.2 The Evolution of Public Utilities
   3.2.1 The Four Epochs of Martin Glaeser
   3.2.2 The Five stages of Farris and Sampson
   3.2.2 The Four Stages of William G. Shepherd

3.3. The Life Cycle of Agencies    3.3.1. Bernstein's Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions
   3.3.2 Down's Life Cycle of Bureaus

3.4 Life Cycles and Evolution: Conclusion
   3.4.1 Assessment of the Models
   3.4.2 Future Theory of Development

Conclusion

Chapter 3: Theories of Regulatory Origin

1.0 The Policy Making Process

2.0 Theories of Regulatory Origin
   2.1 "Public Interest" Theories of Regulation
   2.2 "Private Interest" Theories of Regulation
   2.3 Conclusion

3.0 Four Interest "Theories" of Regulatory Origin; the Bureaucratic/Organizational Approach
   3.1 The Policy Making Process and the Incentive Systems Approach
   3.2 Four Simple Interest Theories of Regulatory Origin
   3.3. The Central Role of the Regulatory Agency as Organization

4.0 Aspects of Regulatory Entry

5.0 An Illustration: The Interstate Commerce Commission
   5.1 Private Interest Theories and the Origin of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
   5.2 Public Interest Theories and the Origin of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
   5.3 Creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
   5.4 The Expansion of the ICC's Mandate
   5.5 The Transportation Act of 1920 and Beyond

6.0 Some Observation on Regulatory Origin

7.0 The Incentive Systems Model of Organizations and Regulatory "Capture"
   7.1 A Partial Theory of Regulatory "Capture"
   7.2 Federal and State Regulators: Evidence for Some Variables in the Theory
      7.2.1 Federal Regulators: Backgrounds
      7.2.2 Federal Regulators: Departures
      7.2.3 Federal Regulators: Resources, especially Salary
      7.2.4 Federal Regulators: Turnover
      7.2.5 State Regulators: Backgrounds
      7.2.6 State Regulators: Departures
      7.2.7 State Regulators: Resources, especially Salary
      7.2.8 State Regulators: Turnover
      7.2.9 The case of State Reclamation Inspectors

8.0 Design and the Public Interest

Chapter 4: The Concept of the Public Interest

1.0 The Public Interest Concept in Utility Regulation: The Public Utility Concept

2.0 The Constitutional/Legal Basis of Regulation in the United States

3.0 A Typology of Conceptions of Public Interest
    3.1 Some Existing Typologies
    3.2 A Typology of Public Interest Conceptions
    3.3 Public Interest Rhetoric
    3.4 Conclusion

Chapter 5: Intermediate Goals and the Rationale for Regulation

1.0 Decision on the "public interest"

2.0 Decision on intermediate goals

3.0 The Rationale for Regulating Intentional Activities
    3.1 Where Competition Cannot Exist
    3.2 Where Competition Exists, but is Imperfect
    3.3. Where Competition Could Exist, but is Not Desired

4.0 The Rationale for Regulating Unintentional Activities
    4.1 Actor/Bystander
    4.2 Effects
    4.3 Responses
5.0 Conclusion

Chapter 6: Organizing Regulation: Considerations in Regulation by Incentives and by Directive

1.0 Sources of Rationalization of Regulatory Institutional Forms and Acts

2.0 Governmental Action in Choosing Forms and Acts as Agency

3.0 Delegation as the Creation of Agents

4.0 Interferences and Comparing Institutions
    4.1 Loci of Interference
    4.2 Interference with Basic Frameworks: Social Choice Processes
    4.3 Interference with Regulating and Regulated Activities: Forms in the Context of Agency
    4.4 Characterization of Regulatory Means by Interference Type
    4.5 Comparing Regulatory Means

5.0 Advantages of Incentive, and of Directive Mechanisms
    5.1 Advantages of Incentives
    5.2 Advantaged of Directives

6.0 Assessment of Comparative Advantage: A Hypothetical Environmental Case

7.0 Conclusions

Chapter 7: Regulation by Incentives: Tax Incentives, Effluent Charges, and Subsidies

1.0 Tax Incentives, Effluent Charges, and Subsidies

2.0 Tax Incentives
    2.1 Advantages of Tax Incentives
    2.2 Disadvantages of Tax Incentives

3.0 Effluent Charges

    3.1 Advantages of Effluent Charges

    3.2 Disadvantages of Effluent Charges

4.0 Subsidies
    4.1 Advantages of Subsidies
    4.2 Disadvantages of Subsidies

5.0 Summary: Tax Incentives, Effluent Charges, and Subsidies

6.0 A Market Alternative: Auctions of Pollution Rights

Chapter 8: Regulation by Directive: Rules and Standards, Public Enterprise

1.0 Rules and Standards

2.0 Public Enterprise

3.0 Advantages and Disadvantages of Rules and Standards

4.0 Advantages and Disadvantages of Public Enterprise

5.0 Contrast with Incentive Means and Conclusion

Chapter 9: Deregulation as a Process of Organizational Reduction

1.0 The Concept of Deregulation

2.0 Regulatory Organizations and Environmental Controls

3.0 Support and Environmental Control

4.0 Forms of Deregulation
    4.1 Informal Deregulation
    4.2 Formal Deregulation
    4.3 Why Any of These Forms is Hard to Get

5.0 Proposing and Opposing Deregulation: Tactics and Strategies
    5.1 Deregulation as a Policy Process
    5.2 Politics and Advocacy of Deregulation Proposing
    5.3 Strategies of Regulated Industry
    5.4 Strategies of Agencies in Response to the Treat of Deregulation
    5.5. Reactions of Bureaucrats to Deregulation

6.0 Conclusion